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INTRODUCTION 
China set a goal in its Medium and Long Term National Plan for 
Science and Technology Development to “noticeably enhance 
indigenous innovation capability . . . and join the ranks of innovative 
countries” by the year 2020.1 To achieve this goal, China aims to rank 
top five in the world in patent filing among other strategic goals such 
as raising research and development (R&D) expenditures to 2.5 % of 
the GDP and reducing dependence on imported technology to 30%.2 
The Chinese government has also identified several strategic 
emerging industries that are key targets for state support in 
stimulating independent innovation capacity. These industries and 
their projects are mostly knowledge-based, such as “National 
Broadband Internet Agenda, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, 
integrated circuits, flat-panel displays, space infrastructure, regional 
aircraft and industrialization of general aviation aircraft, as well as 
major application and demonstration projects on the health of the 
people and on using information technology to benefit the people.”3 
The Report on China’s Economic, Social Development Plan (2011) 
proclaims: 
We will increase spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP to 
1.85%; make positive progress in fostering strategic emerging 
industries and accelerate development of the service sector; achieve 
new results in technological upgrading, elimination of backward 
production facilities, and SOE mergers and reorganizations; reduce 
energy consumption per unit of GDP by 3.5% compared to last 
year, reduce the intensity of carbon dioxide emissions by about 
3.5%, and cut the four major pollutant indexes—chemical oxygen 
demand, total ammonia nitrogen and emissions of sulfur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxide—each by 1.5%; further strengthen ecological 
 
1 THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PRC, National Medium- and Long-Term Program for 
Science and Technology Development of China (2006–2020), II-2, available at 
http://english.wzkj.gov.cn/program/program_detail.aspx?id=1. 
2 Id. 
3 Report on China’s Economic, Social Development Plan (2011), GOV.CN, 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-03/17/content_1826561_11.htm. 
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and environmental improvement; and raise the urbanization level to 
48.3%.4 
It is thus obvious that the Chinese government recognized the 
importance of developing knowledge-based industries in the global 
competition and the role of intellectual property (IP) in stimulating 
innovation in these industries. The question is, however, whether 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) can really prompt innovation, or 
more specifically, whether more patents means more innovations. 
This question has been asked for more than a century and the answer 
is still far from clear. People in different historical eras, countries, 
interest groups, academic disciplines, and ideological camps have 
come up with different conclusions. Much theoretical and empirical 
research has been devoted to proving their views. This paper will not 
attempt to reach a conclusion of any sort, but rather, it intends to 
continue the endeavor of my predecessors in finding empirical 
evidence of the relationship, if any, between IP and innovation. China 
is at the turning point from a developing country to a developed 
country, and from an imitation-oriented country to an innovation-
oriented country. Findings from the study of the relationship between 
IP and innovation of Chinese industries will provide added value to 
the existing evidence and debates. 
Before embarking on the task of finding IP’s impact on innovation 
of Chinese industries, we first define the meaning of innovation so 
that we know clearly the scope and context of innovation when we 
assess the impact of IPRs. Some people may perceive innovation and 
invention as the same thing; therefore defining innovation as the 
discovery of new ideas in a laboratory, publication of research papers, 
and filing patents for these inventions. For those people, the more 
ideas generated, published, and patented means more innovation. 
However, according to the definition provided by 
BusinessDictionary.com, an invention is a: 
New scientific or technical idea, and the means of its embodiment 
or accomplishment. To be patentable, an invention must be novel, 
have utility, and be non-obvious. To be called an invention, an idea 
only needs to be proven as workable. But to be called an innovation, 
it must also be replicable at an economical cost, and must satisfy a 
specific need. That’s why only a few inventions lead to innovations 
because not all of them are economically feasible.5 
 
4 Id. at Pt. II. 
5 Invention Definition, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary 
.com/definition/invention.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2011). 
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Typically, innovation “involves a multifaceted effort: the 
discovery, development, improvement and commercialization of new 
processes and products.”6 These definitions indicate that invention 
involves only early stages of innovation; that is, the discovery and 
generation of new ideas including obtaining patents. Innovation, 
however, entails two or more stages following the invention stage and 
focusing on the commercialization of inventions. In fact, 
commercialization is a crucial stage for innovation, without which 
most inventions “[d]ie a lonely death, never seeing the light of 
commercial success.”7 The number of patents represents how many 
inventions have been generated, not how innovative a country is. 
Patents are important for innovation because they are crucial for 
further commercialization in some technology sectors, but they are 
not the sole indicator of innovation. It follows that when we assess the 
role of IPRs in innovation, we shall not only count how many patents 
have been filed or granted in a particular country, but we shall also 
evaluate how many of the patented technologies have been 
commercialized. 
Based on the above definitions, the discussion of the relationship 
between IP and innovation in Chinese industries will focus not only 
on how many patents have been filed and granted, but also on how the 
patented technologies have been developed, transferred, licensed, 
manufactured, and marketed. This approach will be used in the 
investigation of all the industries we cover in this paper including 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, computer software, 
telecommunications, automobile, and green technology. These are IP-
intensive high-tech industries, and the success of their R&D and 
commercialization may be closely related to, or largely depended, on 
the acquisition, commercialization and exploitation of IPRs. 
Before investigating how patents affect innovation in the identified 
Chinese high-tech industries, a survey of literature on the debate 
about the relationship between IP and innovation is necessary to 
provide a historical and theoretical background. 
  
 
6  Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142, 142 
(2010); See generally Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, AN EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). 
7 Jeffrey L. Brandt, Capturing Innovation: Turning Intellectual Assets into Business 
Assets, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS: INVESTING WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 65 
(Bruce Berman ed., 2002). 
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I 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: EVIDENCES AND 
DEBATES 
A.  IP: Incentive or Impediment in Innovation? 
1.  Justifications for the Creation and Existence of IPRs 
Since the birth of the IP system, various theories have been 
developed to justify its existence.8 For example, natural right theory 
justifies IPRs as a man’s natural property right in his own idea which 
is exclusive and inalienable; labor theory justifies IPRs as a reward 
for the labor invested by the inventor in his invention; personality 
theory justifies IPRs as personhood of the inventor; and utilitarian 
theory justifies IPRs as incentives for innovation.9 Essentially, these 
theories recognize the human nature to own, to be rewarded for what 
they create, and to be incentivized for further creation. A group of 
economists advance these theories further to analyze how and to what 
extent this incentive works to foster innovation in the context of 
economic analysis. For example, in 1962, Kenneth Arrow argued that 
knowledge has become a “good” when it is assimilated as 
information, and hence is subject to property ownership. However, 
the “indivisible” nature of knowledge creates a “free-rider” 
phenomenon; that is, while the first creator of a certain technology 
has to invest a huge amount of financial and human resources, the 
subsequent production may cost very little or nothing at all. This leads 
to “underinvestment” in knowledge production because no one is 
willing to become the first inventor.10 This phenomenon finally 
results in a “waiting game”11 and, in the end, “society at large will 
suffer.”12 
 
8 The discussion that follows is largely based on sections 2.1 and 2.2 of my book; 
Yahong Li, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 8–17 (Edward Elgar ed., 2010). 
9 See generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
10 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 609–26 (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 1962). 
11 Ove Granstrand, Innovation and Intellectual Property (2002), http://www.druid.dk 
/conferences/summer2003/Papers/GRANDSTRAND.pdf. 
12 William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and 
Historical Perspectives, in INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY 2, 2 (Anthony Arundel ed., 2001). 
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This view was echoed by Landes and Posner in their economic 
analysis of copyright and innovation.13 The problem of “under-
investment” in the initial innovation stage may be remedied by 
competition, by some inventors’ pure satisfaction from scientific 
discovery, and their desire for fame and social recognition rather than 
monetary rewards.14 But Arrow concluded that the market itself is 
incapable of solving the “free-rider” problem, and certain 
“institutional arrangements” have to be put in place.15 William Fisher 
identified five strategies, or institutional arrangements, employed by 
national governments: (1) governments engage in technological 
innovation themselves (e.g., in national defense); (2) governments 
subsidize private sectors’ innovation activities (e.g., grants from the 
National Endowment for the Arts to artists in the United States); (3) 
governments issue post-hoc prizes or rewards to innovators; (4) 
governments enact trade secret laws to help increase innovators’ 
competitive advantages; (5) governments confer IPRs on innovators.16 
Other scholars have produced similar lists.17 It is thus clear that the IP 
system is an institutional arrangement that was created to remedy the 
“market failure” in solving the “free-rider” problem and to foster 
innovation, as indicated by the title of the Statute of Anne (1710); 
“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of 
Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the 
Times therein mentioned,”18 and by Article I of the U.S. Constitution 
which grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”19 
 
13 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–33, 344–53 (1989). They wrote, “[w]ithout copyright 
protection, authors, publishers, and copiers would have inefficient incentives with regard 
to the timing of various decisions. Publishers, to lengthen their head start, would have a 
disincentive to engage in prepublication advertising and even to announce publication 
dates in advance, and copiers would have an incentive to install excessively speedy 
production lines.” Id. at 332. 
14 Granstrand, supra note 11. 
15 Arrow, supra note 10. 
16 Fisher, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
17 See, e.g., Granstrand, supra note 11, at 5. 
18 KARL-ERIK TALLMO, THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.copywrighthistory.com/anne.html (discussing The Statute of Anne, 1710). 
19 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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2.  IPRs as an Impediment to Innovation 
From the above account, we know that the IP system is merely one 
of many institutional arrangements employed by national 
governments to promote innovation. But the IP system seems to have 
received the most skepticism and criticism about its role in 
innovation. First of all, many scholars questioned whether IPRs could 
really stimulate innovation at all or to a certain degree. In their work, 
The British Patent System, Boehm and Silberston said that patents 
were largely irrelevant as a means of inducing inventions, and that 
some other stimuli “must have been responsible for the inducement of 
a large body of nineteenth century invention.”20 Ashton, in his 1968 
book, The Industrial Revolution, and Landes in his 1970 book, The 
Unbound Prometheus, reached a similar conclusion.21 Eric Schiff 
studied inventive activity in Switzerland and the Netherlands during 
the period that the two countries abandoned their patent system and 
he concludes that the “industrialization of a country can proceed 
smoothly and vigorously without a national patent system.”22 
Blakeney found that the “assumption that patent protection 
incentivizes innovation has never been convincingly demonstrated, 
even in industrialized countries, although it underpins the globalized 
intellectual property regime.”23 Fritz Machlup concluded, “no 
economist on the basis of present knowledge could possibly state with 
certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net 
benefit or a net loss upon society.”24 Keith Maskus believes that the 
conclusion that stronger IPRs influence foreign investment, licensing 
behavior and the transfer of technology can only be tentatively 
reached because the data and methodology of research to support such 
a conclusion are very weak.25 
Other scholars have critiqued that IPRs play a rather negative role 
in innovation and in social development. For instance, Joseph Stiglitz 
 
20 KLAUS BOEHM & AUBREY SILBERSTON, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM 37 (1967). 
21 T.S. ASHTON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1760–1830 (1968); D.S. LANDES, THE 
UNBOUND PROMETHEUS (1970). 
22 ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE 
NETHERLANDS, 1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907 124 (1971). 
23 Michael Blakeney, Biotechnological Patenting and Innovation, in PATENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 229 (2009). 
24 Staff of S. Comm on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 79–80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup).  
25 See Keith E. Maskus, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY 
BUILDING (2003) (paper presented at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Study, Sept. 18-
21, 2003), available at www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Maskus_Bellagio 
2.pdf. 
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believes that IP regimes stifle science and innovation because they 
“create monopoly power over knowledge that is often abused.”26 
William Fisher pointed out three side effects of IPRs: (1) costly to 
administer; (2) sometimes impeding cumulative innovation; (3) 
pricing consumers.27 Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg 
concluded that patents for upstream medical research can deter 
innovation. They wrote that the proliferation of fragmented and 
overlapping patent rights creates a tragedy of “‘anticommons’ in 
which people underuse scarce resources because too many owners 
can block each other.”28 
3.  IPRs as an Incentive to Innovation 
On the other hand, many scholars argue that the role of IPRs in 
innovation is largely positive. For example, John Barton and Ezekiel 
Emanuel state that the patent is a genius design for the recognition of 
an inventor’s creativity and a means to enhance innovation.29 Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley confirmed that “[p]atent law is [a] primary 
policy tool to promote innovation, encourage the development of new 
technologies, and increase the fund of human knowledge.”30  Dutton 
succinctly summarized the views of some other scholars: 
Holdsworth, for example, claims that during the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries ‘the administration of the law as to the 
grant of patents . . . was successful in encouraging British industry’. 
Fox considered that ‘it was . . . not by accident that the patent 
system had its origins in England nor that the Industrial Revolution 
was the inevitable consequence’ . . . . In a much-neglected book 
Ravenshear argues that ‘patents exercised a net influence in 
stimulating the growth of industry’. For Harding there was ‘little 
doubt that patents helped to create the industrial supremacy which 
existed at the time of the Great Exhibition’. And Hatfield, writing in 
a mood of patriotic zeal, concluded that the ‘patent law was our 
 
26 Dugie Standeford, Intellectual Property Regime Stifles Science and Innovation, 
Nobel Laureates Say, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH BLOG (July 7, 2008, 12:44 AM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/07/07/intellectual-property-regime-stifles-science   
-and-innovation-nobel-laureates-say. 
27 Fisher, supra note 12, at 4. 
28 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998). 
29 John H. Barton & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Patents-Based Pharmaceutical 
Development Process: Rationale, Problems, and Potential Reforms, 294 JAMA 2075 
(2005). 
30 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1576 (2003). 
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invention, and it gave us the first place among nations in industry 
for over 200 years.31 
In the 1960s, economists focused primarily on the effect of patent 
term on innovation. In Arrow’s analysis, imitation can dwindle 
innovator’s profits; thereby reducing innovator’s incentive to invest in 
R&D. The term of patent protection can deter imitation and thereby 
incentivize innovation.32 William Nordhaus found that the increase of 
patent term could boost incentives for generating innovations.33 The 
focus of study shifted in the 1990s from the length of patent 
protection to the optimal scope of patent protection. The 
representatives of this trend include Paul Klemperer,34 Richard 
Gilbert and Carl Shapiro,35 and Lerner.36 Their studies show that the 
scope of patents can impact patent holders’ ability to raise prices on 
the invention costs and product substitutes. Christine Greenhalgh and 
Mark Roger list four ways in which IPRs can promote innovation.37 
First, giving people a monopoly on their innovations will further 
increase the incentive and resources dedicated to innovation. Second, 
venture capitalists are more willing to fund a project that has patent 
protection. Third, firms may invest more in R&D using profits gained 
from IPRs through licensing and various patent strategies. Finally, the 
early disclosure of patent technology enables the dissemination of 
technological information. Christopher Kalanje found that IPRs play 
an indispensible role in every stage of innovation: from the perception 
of innovative ideas to the marketing of a final product.38 Specifically, 
inventors normally must decide to protect their invention either by 
trade secrets or patents at the first stage of the generation of 
innovative ideas, then proceed to search and research on patent 
 
31 H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750–1852 3 (1984) (internal citation omitted). 
32 Granstrand, supra note 11, at 7. 
33 Id. 
34 Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 113 (1990). 
35 Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 106 (1990). 
36 Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND J. 
ECON. 319 (1994). 
37 Christine Greenhalgh & Mark Rogers, The Value of Intellectual Property Rights to 
Firms and Society, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 541 (2007). 
38 Christopher M. Kalanje, Role of Intellectual Property in Innovation and New 
Product Development, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en 
/documents/ip_innovation_development.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). 
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documents, and then file patent applications for their inventions.39 
This is followed by a stage of “IP as Life-Line While Passing 
Through the ‘Valley of Death’ of Innovation” during which patents 
are important to protect know-how when Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) use external technology resources, settle IP 
ownership disputes, find financiers, facilitate sales and licensing, and 
form joint ventures.40 The above studies mirror the reasons for 
supporting the patent system given in the U.S. Report of the 
President’s Commission on the Patent System 1–3 (1966). The report 
states: 
Agreeing that the patent system has in the past performed well its 
Constitutional mandate “to promote the progress of . . . useful arts,” 
the Commission asked itself: What is the basic worth of a patent 
system in the context of present day conditions? The members of 
the Commission unanimously agreed that a patent system today is 
capable of continuing to provide an incentive to research, 
development, and innovation. They have discovered no practical 
substitute for the unique service it renders.41 
The U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) 
concluded that the demand for IP protection increases when a large 
share of the industrial base is engaged in innovative activities.42 The 
International Chamber of Commerce published a report in 2005 
concluding that IP protection correlates with national 
competitiveness. The report pointed out that, in 2004, the twenty 
countries with the strongest IP protection were among the top twenty-
seven in the World Economic Forum (WEF) Growth Competitiveness 
Index, while the twenty countries with the weakest IP regimes ranked 
among the bottom thirty-six for competitiveness.43 
B.  IP and Innovation: Industry Specific Assessment 
In addition to the above two contrary views, some scholars believe 
that the role of patents in innovation varies by context. Specifically, 
they argue that the role of patents is specific to certain industrial 
sectors, types of technology, and stages of innovation. Bronwyn Hall 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 S. Res. 52, 90th Cong. (1967). 
42 See generally COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002). 
43 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SOURCE OF 
INNOVATION, CREATIVITY, GROWTH AND PROGRESS 7 (2005). 
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provided theoretical and empirical evidence on this finding.44 
According to Hall some earlier studies show that when patents are 
granted to single products or pieces of knowledge, it is almost certain 
that the patent will encourage innovation. In some instances, the 
patent may produce “too much” innovation.45 Yet when the patent 
involves multiple products, many pieces of knowledge or multiple 
stages of research (such as “research tools” in upstream medical 
research and downstream drug discovery), or the innovation is 
sequential or cumulative, then the role of patents in innovation may 
be positive in some contexts but negative in others. James Bessen and 
Eric Maskin conclude that there are more innovations without patents 
in sequential cases.46 Others found that patents are only positively 
associated with innovation in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and 
medical instrument areas.47 The U.K.’s Commission on IPRs 
concluded that patents are essential to innovation in the 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum, and some 
components of IT industries.48 
Particularly in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, 
patents are considered important for new spin-off and start-up 
enterprises to attract capital investments and to be used as negotiating 
tools in joint ventures and alliances. A survey conducted by the 
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology (BCLT) in 2008 on high 
technology startup firms in the United States shows that, for the 
biotechnology industry, patents are ranked the most important factor 
for capturing competitive advantage.49 “Even public research 
organizations are placing more strategic value on patenting,” said a 
report written by a group of researchers from the Canadian Program 
on Genomics and Global Health.50 Jasemine Chambers compares the 
 
44 Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 568 
(2007). 
45 Id. at 573. 
46 James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 
RAND J. ECON. 611 (2009). 
47 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. 
SCI. 173 (1986); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R & D 
1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D 
Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RES. 
POL’Y 1349 (2002). 
48 See supra note 42. 
49 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: 
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262 (2009). 
50 Uyen Quach et al., Biotechnology Patenting Takes Off in Developing Countries, 8 
INT’L J. BIOTECHNOLOGY. 43, 45 (2006). 
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biotechnology patenting regimes in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan, and reaches the conclusion that: 
The United States has capitalized its strong biotechnology research 
base and broad concepts of patent-eligible subject matter to lead the 
world in biotechnological research and development . . . . Just as 
developing countries can accrue a temporary free-rider advantage 
by providing minimal patent protection, Europe and Japan have 
limited their patent protection in those biotechnological areas that 
trail the United States. While such limited patent protection 
provides short-term benefits, it also runs the risk of locking Europe 
and Japan into long-term position of technological inferiority by 
failing to adequately protect research and development investments 
in biotechnology.51 
Patents are considered particularly important for pharmaceutical 
R&D, as it involves eight to twelve years of clinical trials, regulatory 
approval, and $500 to $800 million. Without patents to enable firms 
to recoup their investment, it is almost certain that few firms would be 
willing or able to engage in any drug discovery. In the words of the 
Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Jacob, a Judge of the Court of Appeals of England 
and Wales in charge of the Intellectual Property List: 
It is the patent system, which has made the advances in medicines 
possible. Although economists sometimes debate whether the patent 
system is useful generally, no one has ever seriously challenged its 
place for medicines. And that is because it is so obvious that 
without a reliable patent monopoly there is simply no incentive to 
invest.52 
However, as mentioned above, Heller and Eisenberg argued that 
patents for upstream medical research could deter innovation and 
create “tragedy of the anticommons.”53 Based on the studies of 
genomic diagnostics, John Barton discovered that patents for devices 
such as the oligonucleotide chip, which is used for sequencing, 
seeking mutations, testing pathogens to evaluate different forms of 
drug resistance, and testing cancer cells to determine the specific 
mutation involved, “raise no problem of excluding others from 
detecting the same mutations in different ways; they almost certainly 
 
51 Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United 
States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 223, 245–46 (2002). 
52 The Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Jacob, Patents and Pharmaceuticals—a Paper Given on 29th 
November at the Presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition’s Preliminary 
Report of the Pharma-Sector Inquiry (Nov. 29, 2008) (available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/jacob.pdf). 
53 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 28. 
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serve as useful incentives to develop new technologies.”54 But patents 
for “the use of a specific gene sequence to identify a specific 
biological property (that is, patents on specific diagnostic sequences 
or on pathogen or cancer-related mutations) pose a particular 
problem,” because “they may make it difficult for the integrator of a 
microarray/chip device to assemble the rights to use the different 
patented sequences that are relevant to a clinical or research 
application.”55 
Patents are equally important in innovation for hardware 
companies including medical hardware, such as surgical devices, and 
IT hardware, such as computers and semiconductors.56 But they are 
less important for software firms.57 The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey 
shows that two-thirds of about 700 surveyed software firms report 
that they neither have, nor are seeking patents for their inventions, 
and they rate patents as the least important tools among seven options 
for attaining a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Even 
software startups consider patents as an insignificant incentive to 
invest in innovation.58 Among all the factors affecting the firms’ 
decision not to obtain patents, cost stands out as the number one 
factor. About forty percent of the firms surveyed reported that the 
costs for obtaining and enforcing patents were the most important 
factor in their decision to forego patents, while more than forty 
percent cited the unpatentability of the invention as a factor.59 
Due to the diverse role of patents among various technologies, 
scholars have developed theories about whether a patent right (or how 
much of a patent right) should be given to inventions produced in 
different industrial sectors and stages of research. In 1977, a “prospect 
theory” was developed by Edmund Kitch, who argued that patents 
encourage further commercialization and more efficient use of 
unrealized ideas, just as a “prospect” system encourages a landowner 
to make efficient use of his or her private land. As such, strong rights 
should be given to a single entrepreneur. The “patents should be 
broad, stand alone, and confer almost total control over subsequent 
 
54 John H. Barton, Emerging Patent Issues in Genomic Diagnostics, 24 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 939, 939 (2006). 
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56 Stuart J.H. Graham et al., supra note 49, at 1262. 
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58 Pamela Samuelson, Why Software Startups Decide to Patent . . . Or Not: Berkeley 
Patent Survey Finds First-Mover Advantage Trumps Patents for Some, O’REILLY RADAR 
(July 21, 2010), http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/07/why-software-startups-decide-t.html. 
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uses of the product.”60 In 1990, the theory of “tailored incentives” was 
developed by Robert Merges and Richard Nelson based on the 
“cumulative innovation” model. According to this theory, since 
innovations are cumulative, patent rights should be granted to both 
the initial inventor and subsequent improvers so that an incentive to 
innovate can be fairly maintained.61 In 1998, an “anticommons” 
theory emerged to adjust the “tailored incentives” theory by pointing 
out that patents that horizontally cover different species, as well as 
vertically protecting different steps, will render resources in the 
commons underused because patent owners can block each other. To 
solve this problem, the patents should either be consolidated into a 
single hand, or be eliminated altogether for certain types of 
innovations, for example, upstream research tools.62 Barton also 
proposed two possible ways to limit patent rights to diagnostic 
sequences; one is to reject patent coverage, and another is to require 
patentees to grant reasonable royalty licenses for use of the sequence 
as a part of an array, or for use of the sequence in pharmacogenetics.63 
Building on the above theories, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley 
proposed an “industry-specific” theory to see how these theories best 
fit various industries so that the role of patents in innovation can be 
maximized.64 They found that industries vary greatly in terms of 
innovation, and each of the above theories may fit better in one kind 
of industry but not another. For example, “cumulative innovation 
theory” fits best in business methods, software, and, arguably, 
Internet industries, while “prospect theory” fits best with the 
pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, “prospect theory” can be used 
to justify strong and broad patent rights granted to the initial inventors 
in the pharmaceutical industry because: (1) the pharmaceutical 
industry normally has long development and testing lead times; (2) it 
is very expensive to innovate, costing as much as $800 million on 
R&D for each new drug; (3) its products are easy to imitate, and 
generic producers can avoid R&D costs entirely; (4) if a patent does 
not cover a group of related products, imitators can easily design 
around the patent by using a close chemical analog; and (5) much of 
the work occurs after the drug is first identified, so it is important to 
 
60 Burk & Lemley, supra note 30, at 1615-16. 
61 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
62 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 698. 
63 Barton & Ezekiel, supra note 54. 
64 Burk & Lemley, supra note 30, at 1578. 
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give patentees the right to coordinate downstream changes to the 
drug. 
In the same vein, “anti-commons theory” can also be used to 
support strong and concentrated patent rights in the biotechnology 
industry because, as in the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology is 
a high-cost and high-risk industry. But on the other hand, attention 
has to be paid to the “anti-commons” problem caused by patenting 
upstream research tools. Based on these analyses, Burk and Lemley 
concluded that patent law should not be uniformly applied across 
different industries; instead, courts should apply various policy levers 
of patent law to accommodate the specific nature of different 
technologies and industries. For example, within the pharmaceutical 
industry, fewer and broader patents should be granted with more 
relaxed disclosure requirements and strengthened doctrines of 
equivalents. Within the biotechnology industry, there should likewise 
be fewer and broader patents with more relaxed written enablement 
requirements, as well as strengthened doctrines of equivalents and 
experimental use exceptions. 
C.  IP and Innovation: Country Specific Assessment 
1.  The United States 
The United States is arguably the most innovative country in the 
world; it is therefore helpful to investigate how intellectual property 
rights affect innovation in this country. It is commonly known that the 
United States is responsible for many of the world’s modern 
inventions, including electricity, penicillin, the printing press, the car, 
the telephone, the airplane, the computer, the camera, eyeglasses, 
cotton gin, metal cans for food, the iPod, the Internet, etc.65 At the 
same time, the United States is also a leader in patenting. In the 
1980s, the annual patents filed in the United States numbered about 
60,000, and this number was increased to 150,000 by the late 1990s.66 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of granted patents doubled in the 
biotechnology and computer sectors.67 The top 100 U.S. universities 
tripled their annual patent output from 1984 to 1994.68 Of course, 
there are many factors contributing to the United States’ leading 
 
65 See generally RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
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position in innovation, such as a better education system and more 
talented people, more investment in innovation and good innovation 
policies, and so on. However, from the perspective of law and 
economics, it is not a coincidence that the United States tops the 
world on both innovation and patents. 
Although patents are one of the indicators of innovation, the sheer 
number of patents does not explain why the United States has 
obtained its leading position in innovation. As we mentioned in the 
beginning of this paper, the number of patents can represent the 
number of inventions generated, but innovation involves multifaceted 
efforts in commercialization of patented technologies. Compared with 
other countries, the United States’ governmental policies and patent 
system are much more focused on fostering commercialization of 
patented technologies. Its patent system, including patent legislation, 
prosecution, litigation, and management, is designed to be pro-
innovation. First of all, U.S. patent law covers the broadest patentable 
subject matter, to allow newly emerged technologies to be patented. 
U.S. patent law provides that “Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”69 
Under this provision, anyone who “discovers,” not merely “invents,” 
new and useful products and processes can obtain a patent. Although 
the distinction between “discovery” and “invention” is not clearly 
made, the former normally refers to findings from nature without 
much human intervention, and the latter refers to something generated 
by humans in a laboratory. While patent laws of other jurisdictions 
exclude “discoveries” from patentable subject matter almost without 
exception, the U.S. patent law arguably allows “discovery” to be 
patentable. This opens the door for patents on microorganisms, genes, 
plants, etc. In addition, unlike other jurisdictions that negatively 
exclude many subject matters from patentability, U.S. patent law 
positively lists patentable subject matter without any explicit 
exclusion. The patentable subject matters cover four broad areas 
including process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, 
and improvement, so that many inventions can be interpreted as 
patentable inventions.70 For example, pharmaceuticals and chemical 
substances can be patented as composition of matter. Furthermore, 
under U.S. patent law’s utility requirement, a new invention is 
 
69 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
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patentable as long as it is “useful.”71 The law does not require it to be 
industrially applicable, to be moral, and to produce positive effects as 
required under the patent laws of many other jurisdictions. Therefore, 
some inventions whose utility was unidentifiable at the time of 
discovery (e.g., CCR5 receptor gene),72 and some considered 
patentable living matters in the past (e.g., onco-mouse) have been 
patented.73 
Case law has further broadened the patentable subject matter. For 
example, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, “anything under the sun that is made by man” is 
patentable.74 And a series of other court decisions such as Diamond v. 
Diehr75 and State Street Bank v. Signature76 expanded patent subject 
matter to include software and business methods. 
Second, the United States adopts an inventor-friendly patent 
prosecution process. Until recently, the United States has been the 
only country using the “first-to-invent” approach in the patent filing 
system. It has been argued that this system is beneficial to small 
businesses and individual inventors who do not have sufficient 
resources to race to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
and that the pending amendment to change it to a “first-to-file” 
system will kill U.S. innovation.77 Another distinctive feature of the 
U.S. patent prosecution system is the “one-year grace period,” which 
allows inventors to file patents one year after their inventions have 
been disclosed.78 This regime arguably provides an incentive for early 
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72 Human Genome Sciences Inc. (HGS) of Rockville, Maryland, was awarded a patent 
for CCR5 receptor gene in February 2000. When the patent application was filed, the 
specific function of the protein of CCR5 gene was not disclosed. It was only discovered 
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Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0008 (2001). 
73 Oncomouse was patented in 1988 by Harvard College. It is also called “Harvard 
Oncomouse.” Specifically, the mouse is injected with an activated oncogene which makes 
the mouse more susceptible to cancer so that it can be used for cancer research. See 
Bioethics and Patent Law: The case of the Oncomouse, WIPO MAGAZINE, 
http://www.wipo.int /wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html. 
74 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
75 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
76 State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
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78 35 U.S.C. 102(b) (2002) provides that “A person shall be entitled to a patent 
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disclosure of new inventions and application for patents. The third 
unique feature of the U.S. patent prosecution system is its 
“provisional patent application,” which gives inventors additional 
time to further develop the invention, determine the marketability of 
the invention, acquire funding, and seek licensing and manufacturing 
opportunities. Third, the United States has a pro-patentee litigation 
system. Between 1982 and 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuits (CAFC) upheld ninety percent of the decisions ruled in favor 
of the patentee compared with sixty-two percent during 1953–1978, 
and the Court overturned twenty-eight percent of the decisions ruled 
in favor of the alleged patent infringers, compared with twelve 
percent previously, and increased in the granting of preliminary 
injunctions.79 The ruling by the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.80 allowed the flexible 
application of the “doctrine of equivalents,” greatly helped the 
patentees in their infringement suits. 
Lastly, the U.S. Congress passed a series of legislation aimed to 
foster innovation and IP commercialization. For example, in 1980, the 
Bayh-Dole Act81 was passed to allow federally funded research 
institutions to retain patent rights and to commercialize the inventions 
through exclusive licensing. In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Restoration Act, known as “Hatch-Waxman Act,”82 was passed 
to restore up to five years of lost patent time on clinical trails and 
FDA approval. In 1986, the Federal Technology Transfer Act83 was 
passed to make technology transfer a responsibility and a promotional 
criterion for federal laboratory scientists and engineers. And in 1999, 
the American Inventors Protection Act84 was passed to require the 
publication of patent applications eighteen months from the first filing 
so that the public can benefit from the earlier disclosure of patented 
information. 
While a pro-innovation patent system has a very positive effect on 
promoting innovation in the United States, but it has also produced 
some unintended side effects. For example, increasing patent filing 
 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of application for patent in the United States.” 
79 Gallini, supra note 66, at 134. 
80 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 553 U.S. 722 (2002). 
81 U.S. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. 200-12 (1980). 
82 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417 (1984). 
83 Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA) Pub. L., No. 99-502 (1986). 
84 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L., No. 106-113 (1999). 
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has created a backlog of 1.2 million non-provisional patent 
applications, which may result in poor patent examination quality, 
ultimately leading to many bad patents. There are also increasing 
complaints about the rise of the patent trolls, escalating damage 
awards, and antitrust disputes. 
2.  IP and Innovation in Developing Countries 
The above theories are largely focused on industrialized countries. 
Though disputed, the role of IP in developed countries is generally 
viewed as necessary and positive, with some disagreement on exactly 
how important the patent is in different industrial sectors. The role of 
IP in developing countries, on the other hand, has generally been 
perceived as insignificant or irrelevant in promoting innovation. For 
example, a study concludes that, “by far the most efficient way for 
developing countries (and also industrialized countries) of 
encouraging the production of new technology is an increase in 
education in the technical and science field and not a law on the 
protection of inventions.”85 Carlos Primo Braga found “there is very 
little empirical evidence of the impact of stronger intellectual property 
protection on domestic R&D in developing countries.”86 Another 
study found that the strength of IPRs is positively associated with 
R&D investment in countries with above-median income, but not for 
less-developed countries.87 The U.K. Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights reached similar conclusion in its report: 
[F]or most developing countries with weak technological capacity, 
the evidence on trade, foreign investment, and growth suggests IP 
protection will have little impact . . . For more technologically 
advanced developing countries, the balance is finer. Dynamic gains 
may be achieved through IP protection, but at costs to other 
industries and consumers.88 
However, more recent studies, particularly in biotechnology area, 
have found that the connection between IP and innovation does exist 
in developing countries. In a study on genomic medicine in Mexico, 
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India, and Thailand, the researchers identified the inadequacy of 
existing regulatory and intellectual property regimes in these 
countries as one of the most significant obstacles to advances in 
genomics.89 They further concluded in their report that, “in health 
biotechnology, intellectual property protection remains a vital factor 
towards the establishment of a private sector and the 
commercialization of products in developing countries.”90 Another 
study examined Brazil’s biotech industry and identified an inefficient 
patenting system as one of the four major barriers to bio-health 
development. Specifically, Brazilian patent law does not protect some 
important biotechnologies, such as recombinant version of proteins 
found in nature, and it takes a very long time (more than seven years) 
to process patent applications for drug candidates.91 Furthermore, a 
study on India’s biotechnology industry noted that Indian biotech 
firms aim to become more competitive by patenting their products 
and technologies on a global basis.92 Professor Joseph Straus also 
attributed the recent growth of India’s pharmaceutical sector to a 
stronger patent regime, which India adopted in compliance with the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), for example, by achieving TRIPS protection standards in 
pharmaceutical patent protection.93 
II 
IP AND INNOVATION IN CHINA’S HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES 
We know from the above section that China ranked fourth in the 
world in Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filings. Next we analyze 
the application for PCT and other patents by China’s different 
industrial sectors, as well as their IP commercialization. According to 
a statistic of China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), 
Chinese enterprises have recognized the importance of, and have 
become very active in, filing PCT patents, which reflects the trend of 
China’s current economic development. Since 2009, China has 
replaced Germany as the leading export country, requiring Chinese 
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enterprises to increase protection of their technologies in overseas 
markets. In the meantime, the innovative capability of Chinese 
enterprises has greatly increased in recent years, further promoting 
awareness of IPR protection among these enterprises. Accordingly, 
while PCT applications worldwide declined 4.5% in 2009 due to 
global financial crisis, China’s PCT application scored a 30% 
increase.94 Most of these PCT applications came from enterprises 
(e.g., 60.6% in 2008) that are controlled by private shareholders (e.g., 
50%). TABLE 1 below shows that the Chinese PCT filings in 2007–
2008 were primarily concentrated in IT (telecommunications 
equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing) 
and medical and pharmaceutical manufacturing areas, counting for 
19.5% and 18.1% of all filings in those years.95 In 2009, Chinese 
enterprises filed 20% of PCT applications worldwide in the field of 
telecommunications, and 2.5% in medical and pharmaceutical 
fields.96 Two companies, Hauwei and ZTE, have stood out as top PCT 
filers. Huawei ranked first in 2008 and second in 2009 respectively, 
and ZTE jumped from twenty-third in 2009 to second in 2010.97 
However, other areas witnessed much less explosive achievements. 
The sections that follows will focus on six industries categorized 
into three groups: (1) Health-related industries (biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals), (2) Information technology industries (software and 
telecommunications), and (3) Environment-related industries 
(automobile and green-technologies). Each industry will be examined 
separately, with a brief introduction of their industry and R&D 
models, and followed by a discussion of their patenting and 
commercialization status. The categorical analysis of the empirical 
data and facts should provide a clearer and more objective assessment 
of the role of that IP plays in Chinese industries. 
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TABLE 1. Enterprises Applying PCT and Domestic Applications (%) 
in 2007–2008 
Industrial Sectors PCT Filings Domestic Filings 
Telecom manufacturing, computer 
& other electric manufacturing  19.5% 12.3% 
Pharmaceutical manufacturing 18.1% 13.7% 
Chemicals and chemical products 
manufacturing, oil and nuclear fuel 
processing industry 
10.3% 12.8% 
Electrical machinery and 
equipment manufacturing 9.3% 6.9% 
Special equipment manufacturing 7.8% 11.4% 
Information transmission, 
computer services and software 
industry 
6.7% 5.7% 
Transportation equipment 
manufacturing 4.5% 4.4% 
Metal smelting, rolling and 
processing industry 4% 6.2% 
Handicrafts and other 
manufacturing 3.6% 3.3% 
General equipment manufacturing 3.2% 3.5% 
Source: SIPO Patent Statistics Brief Report 2010 (16) 
A.  Health-Related Industries (Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals) 
1.  Industry, Market, and R&D Model 
The growth of China’s biotech and pharmaceutical industries and 
market has been remarkable in the past three decades. The Chinese 
biotech market is projected to reach $9 billion by 2010, and the 
biotech industry is expected to account for about seven to eight 
percent of China’s GDP by 2020. The Chinese pharmaceutical market 
is expected to become the world’s third largest market by 2011, 
behind France and Germany, with the sales projected to reach $40 
billion by 2013.98 The innovative capacity of China’s biotech and 
 
98 David Campbell & Mandy Chui, Pharmerging Shake-Up: New Imperatives in a 
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pharmaceutical industries can be summarized as follows: it is 
relatively high in the basic research areas such as genomics, 
proteomics, transgenic plants, animal cloning, and stem cell, the 
expertise of which “already stands out at the international level.”99 
But innovation is fairly low in drug discovery and commercialization 
for both chemical drugs and traditional Chinese medicines (TCM).100 
It was estimated in 2004 that, of the 1300 synthetic medicines 
produced by Chinese firms, ninety-seven percent are imitation,101 and 
out of more than 1000 companies involving in anti-cancer drug 
development, ninety-nine percent produce imitated drugs.102 The 
imitation rate is even higher in biotechnology, where biogenerics are 
estimated to make up more than ninety percent of the $3 billion 
Chinese biopharmaceutical market.103 The typical R&D models in 
China’s biotech and pharmaceutical industries are “me too” and “me 
better” which save money and time but involve tremendous technical 
and legal risks.104 There are a few successful “me too” or “me better” 
gene therapy drugs being developed in China. For example, Endostar, 
H101, and Gendicine were developed based on similar products 
initially developed in other countries, with some improvements in 
increasing activation and reducing toxicity.105 
2.  Patentability and Patenting Status 
Chinese patent law is a mirror image of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) on patentable biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 
That is, limitations on patentable subject matter are in a negative list 
of exclusion, rather than the positive listing used in U.S. patent law. 
For example, “scientific discoveries”, “methods for the diagnosis for 
treatment of diseases,” “animal and plant varieties,” and any 
invention that is against public interest or social morality is excluded 
from patentable subject matter.106 Patent Examination Guidelines 
formulated by SIPO provide further guidance on what is patentable. 
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Generally, “biological materials per se” (e.g., gene, plasmid, 
microorganism, and animal or plant cell lines), genetic materials (e.g., 
DNA, RNA and chromosomes), microorganisms, and chemical 
substances and pharmaceuticals, as well as processes for producing 
the above substances, are patentable.107 The lack of patent protection 
for animal and plant varieties has been criticized as a major obstacle 
to China’s biotechnology development. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
Patent Law Article 25 allows the processes used in creating animals 
and plants to be patented if they are not essentially biological.108 This 
has created a “back door” for animal and plant varieties to be 
patentable.109 Ultimately, Chinese patent law protects patentable 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical inventions less broadly than under 
U.S. patent law, but a broader spectrum of patentable subject matter is 
available in China thanks to more liberal Examination Guidelines. 
While it may be appropriate for the current developmental stage of 
these industries, broader protection may be needed if China wishes to 
become a leader in these fields. 
Even with such obstacles, the increase in biotech and 
pharmaceutical patenting in China has been remarkable. From 2002 to 
2005, the annual rate of increase was 23%. By the end of 2006, the 
total number of applications for biotech-related inventions examined 
by the SIPO was around 37,300, of which 23,300 were domestic 
applications (62.5%) and 14,000 were foreign applications (37.5%). 
From 2000 on, domestic applications have exceeded foreign 
applications for biotech-related patent applications. In 2006, domestic 
applications accounted for 66% of the total applications.110 The top 
ten biotechnology innovations by number of domestic patents filed 
are: (1) peptides that have more than 20 amino acids; (2) mutations or 
genetic engineering; (3) enzymes or diagnostic methods to test for 
microorganisms; (4) microorganisms and their combinants; (5) 
enzymes; (6) medical and pharmaceutical peptide substitutes; (7) 
chemical analyses of living organisms; (8) methods of gene 
modification; (9) undifferentiated human, animal, or plant cells; and 
(10) medical and pharmaceutical antigen or antibody substitutes. This 
list is very similar to the top ten technologies filed by foreign patent 
applicants. This indicates that China’s biotechnology and 
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pharmaceutical sectors closely follow biotechnology advances that 
develop in other countries.111 
Among all the filings in this area, applications for gene related 
inventions constitute more than 60%; 1321 gene patents were granted 
in 2008.112 From 1996–2008, a total of 63,000 chemical drug patent 
applications had been examined among which 29,000 were from 
domestic applicants and 34,000 were from foreign applicants.113 In 
terms of quality of patent applications: 
MPCs mostly focus on medicine compound (over 80 per cent) 
which has the highest innovative value, while Chinese applicants 
primarily focus on surrounding technologies such as medicine 
preparation craft (37.5 per cent) and medicine composition (27 per 
cent). The above facts indicate that foreign competitors, especially 
MPCs, are still technologically dominating China’s chemical drugs 
industry.114 
Chinese companies also filed a large number of patents applications 
for antibodies, for example, 5156, but it is still low compared with the 
60,000 U.S. patent filings.115 Patent applications for TCM are mostly 
for prescriptions rather than active ingredients and filed by 
individuals rather than enterprises, indicating a low level of 
innovation and a low rate of commercialization.116 It is worth noting 
that in the last two years patent applications for pharmaceutical 
manufacturing has witnessed a remarkable growth in China. For 
example, in 2009, domestic filings for pharmaceuticals were over 
10,000, and PCT filings were 317, which ranks as the second highest 
filing rate after patent filings for telecommunications by Chinese 
enterprises (see TABLE 1 above). However, the numbers are still fairly 
low compared to global pharmaceutical filings, for example, only 
2.6% of 12,200 global pharmaceutical patent filings.117 
In summary, patent filings in China’s biotech and pharmaceutical 
sectors have had remarkable growth in recent years, and the areas of 
technology that have been filed for patent protection are closely 
following top technologies in the world. However, both quantity and 
quality of patent applications in these two fields are still relatively 
low compared with those in developed countries. 
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3.  Commercialization 
IP commercialization in both the biotech and pharmaceutical 
industries in China has not been very successful. The 
commercialization rate of biotechnology inventions in 2002, for 
instance, was estimated to be 0.5%,118 although it might be much 
higher now. There are major obstacles to commercialization. First, 
there is a lack of infrastructure for commercialization in China. The 
chain between universities, research institutions, biotechnology 
companies, pharmaceutical companies, and the national health care 
system is often broken, and there has been a shortage of expertise on 
technology transfer.119 
Second, very few inventions have been patented. It was estimated 
in 2006 that only one out of thirty inventions that were published in 
scientific journals were filed for patents.120 
Third, funding for commercialization has not been sufficient. 
Government funding is increasing but not enough: 
Even for the companies that do receive some start-up funds from 
the government, these funds are relatively small; for example, 
Chinese funding totaled $2 billion in 2007, as compared with $273 
billion in 2003 by the U.S. government. Moreover, this funding 
does not cover all stages of commercialization, such as research 
done by biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. 
Furthermore, funding from private investments is also very limited. 
While the top eight MPCs invest an annual average of twenty-three 
percent into R&D, the top Chinese bio-pharmaceutical companies 
invest less than ten percent. The lack of funding then directly affects 
the prospects for commercialization121 
 And “[s]ome research results stay in laboratories without ever 
being commercialized, while others are transferred to biotechnology 
companies for further R&D but are discontinued because investors 
are unwilling or unable to pour more money into the midstream 
research requiring substantial investment.”122 Private funding and VC 
funds are also increasing. For example, among PCT applicants, 57.9% 
come from individuals and 36.8% from enterprises.123 VC funds are 
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available, but China’s capital market is plagued with irregularities and 
immaturity.124 
4.  Patent disputes 
In China, within the pharmaceutical industry, “disputes over patent 
rights have been on the rise in recent years. In earlier years, these 
were usually disputes between Chinese companies. With the 
expansion of foreign drug companies into China, more disputes are 
found between Chinese pharmaceutical companies and MPCs.”125 For 
example, in 2001, twelve Chinese pharmaceutical companies filed a 
request with the SIPO to invalidate Pfizer’s patent for Viagra in 
China,126 After the SIPO issued the decision in 2004 to invalidate the 
patent on the ground that the patent application lacked full disclosure 
in its description, Pfizer sued the SIPO in a Beijing court.127 Two 
years later in 2006, the court ruled in favor of Pfizer, which was 
appealed by the Chinese companies.128 The Beijing High Court finally 
affirmed the lower court decision in 2007.129 Another high profile 
dispute occurred between Eli Lilly and Ganli, a Chinese 
pharmaceutical company in 2005. The two companies sued each other 
for patent infringement of their inventions for recombinant human 
insulin. The Beijing High Court ruled in favor of Ganli in 2007 on the 
ground of Bolar exemption, that is, Ganli’s act of applying 
“Recombinant Insulin Lispro Injection” to SFDA and obtaining the 
registration permit does not constitute exploration of the subject 
patent of Eli Lilly.130 The third case involves a dispute between a 
Chinese pharmaceutical company, Wansheng, and a Japanese 
pharmaceutical company, Sankyo, over a patent on Sankyo’s drug 
“Olmesartan Medoxomil” used to treat or prevent high blood 
pressure. Sankyo accused Wansheng of infringing its patent when 
producing a large quantity of Olmesartan Medoxomil during its 
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application to SFDA for drug registration.131 The Beijing No. 2 
Intermediate Court ruled for Wansheng on the same ground as in the 
case of Eli Lilly v. Ganli.132 These are only three of the many cases 
between Chinese pharmaceutical companies and MPCs. The trend of 
the court rulings seems to have switched from pro-MPCs to pro-
domestic companies. Whether this is a good sign for the innovation of 
Chinese biotech and pharmaceutical industries will be discussed later. 
B.  Information Technology Industry (Software and 
Telecommunications) 
1.  Software Industry 
To prompt the development of the industry, in June 2000, China’s 
State Council issued “Several Policies for Encouraging the 
Development of Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry” 
(Circular 18),133 which greatly boosted the rapid growth of the two 
industries in China. However, after many years, China’s software 
industry is still lagging behind the software industry of developed 
countries as well as some developing countries such as India. It was 
estimated that there were about 15,000 Chinese software enterprises 
by the end of 2004, and sales reached 230 billion yuan (about $35 
billion U.S.) during June 2000 to December 2004.134 In 2009, the top 
100 Chinese software enterprises’ sales reached 244.87 billion yuan 
(about $36 billion U.S.),135 which is less than the sales of Microsoft 
alone ($58.4 billion).136 On January 28, 2011, the State Council issued 
another notice, 2011 No. 4 Document, entitled “State Council 
Circular on Dissemination of Several Policies for Further 
Encouraging the Development of Software Industry and Integrated 
Circuit (IC) Industry” (Circular 4).137 This document identifies the 
software industry as a “national strategic new industry,” and “IP 
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policy” as one of the seven policies provided for in this document.138 
The document stresses the importance of IP protection of software 
and IC, encourages the registration of software copyright, and calls 
for the strengthened IP protection to software and IC in the Internet 
environment. In addition, the document also specifically addresses the 
issues of commercial use of IP, such as pledge and loan, and pointed 
out that it is important to combat the acts of IP abuse such as 
excluding and constraining competition and abuse of the dominant 
position.139 
Computer programs, per se, are not patentable under Chinese 
Patent Law Article 25.140 In order to get a patent grant, a computer 
program must constitute technical features or solutions that can solve 
technical problems and achieve technical effects.141 The following 
software-related inventions have been considered patentable: the 
program used in industrial process control to improve computer 
internal process, in measurement, control of measurement, or test 
processes, in external data processing, and in coding and imputing 
Chinese characters.142  Pure software, software recorded on CD-
ROM, and simple pieced-together software stored in the computer 
memory with processing equipment are not patentable due to the lack 
of technical solutions.143 Compared with Europe and the United 
States, Chinese patentability criteria for computer software are more 
restrictive as they require technicality in three aspects: feature, means, 
and effects, while the EU only requires “technical contributions,”144 
and the U.S. grants patents to any computer program that is “useful, 
concrete and [produce] tangible result[s].”145 The restrictiveness of 
the patentability criteria has direct impact on patenting activity. For 
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example, before 1993, China’s Patent Examination Guidelines (1986) 
required that computer programs be designed to cause changes (e.g., 
improvement or controlling function) of computer hardware to be 
patentable.146 Under this requirement, very little computer software 
was patentable. Accordingly, the number of annual patent 
applications for software before 1993 was under 100, accounting for 
only 0.5% of the total annual patent applications in China.147 In 1993, 
the Guidelines were revised to abandon the “hardware change” 
requirement, and to allow a computer program to be patented as long 
as it possesses some technical features and can be used as a technical 
means to produce some technical effects.148 As a result, annual 
software patent applications reached 1000 in 2000, accounting for 
2.19% of national filings.149 In the period of 2000–2005, the growth 
rate of annual software patent filings was maintained at about 
53.7%.150 
However, compared with other industries, patent applications for 
computer software among Chinese software companies are still 
generally low. The diagram above shows that both PCT and domestic 
filings for software by Chinese companies are at the lower end, 
accounting for 6.7% and 5.7% respectively. This has not excluded the 
filings for information transmission and computer service 
technologies. According to statistics, from 1990 to 2008, a total of 
59,755 software patents were granted in China, of which 22,297 were 
granted to the top ten software companies.151 Among those companies 
there was only one Chinese company, ZTE, which owns 868 software 
patents.152 Out of the forty-six companies that owned over 200 
patents, only five Chinese companies held 5.5% of all granted 
software patents, while American and Japanese companies together 
held 36.1% of Chinese software patents.153 This indicates that the 
majority of Chinese software patents are in the hands of multinational 
corporations. In addition, none of the five Chinese companies 
mentioned above are pure software companies; rather, their main 
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businesses are electronic technology, telecommunications, and 
mechanical manufacturing. 
Whether the low rate of patent filings for computer software is the 
cause of the low level of innovation in China’s software industry is 
not very clear. From various discussions and public speeches, it seems 
that IP is not a major factor contributing to the low level of innovation 
in this industry.154 The frequently mentioned factors include the small 
scale of industry, lack of funding from VC, and lack of talents.155 
2.  Telecommunications Industry 
China is now being viewed as “a telecommunications 
manufacturing and research powerhouse.”156 Due to its large 
population, China owns the largest fixed-line and mobile network in 
the world. As of June 2010, China has 306 million fixed-line 
subscribers and 796 million mobile customers. Technologies that 
have been used to provide services including ADSL, wireless LAN, 
IP (Internet Protocol) telephone, SMS, MMS, and ring tone 
downloading. 
The Chinese telecom industry has been dominated by three state-
run businesses: China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile. 
Two other telecom companies, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and 
ZTE Corporation, rose very quickly as telecom equipment 
manufacturers. They together occupied 66% of Chinese 3G wireless 
equipment market (thirty percent and thirty-six percent respectively). 
Huawei is the world’s second largest telecom equipment provider, the 
largest mobile broadband provider with 55% market share, first in the 
Mobile Softswitch market with 40.6% market share, and first in the 
IMS&NGN market by revenue with 27% market share.157 Hauwei’s 
sales revenue exceeded $21.8 billion USD in 2009, and net profit 
reached $2.7 billion USD in 2009.158 ZTE is the second-largest 
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Chinese telecom equipment maker, the world’s fifth-largest mobile 
phone manufacturer, and the world’s third-largest vendor of GSM 
telecom equipment, with sales accounting for about 20% of all GSM 
gear sold in the world in 2009.159 
The two companies also rank among the top ten patent applicants 
under the PCT system. Huawei ranked first, second, and fourth in 
2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively, and ZTE jumped from twenty-
third in 2009 to second in 2010.160 Specifically for Huawei, the 
company adopts a “customer-centric” innovation strategy and focuses 
on filing patents, adopting technology standards, and seeking cross-
licensing deals.161 As of December 2010, Huawei filed a total of 
49,040 patents of which 17,765 had been granted. Among its filings, 
800 to 900 were filed in the United States, about 600 in Europe, and 
200 to 300 in Japan,162 indicating that its primary customers are 
overseas. Huawei also adopts a vigorous patent review system under 
which its patent review board would reject, based on the scores of 
different criteria, about 50% of the patent applications proposed by its 
employees.163 Huawei also holds 7% of the world’s Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) essential patents, and 
participated in 123 international standard groups including ITU, 
3GPP, 3GPP2, OMA, ETSI and IETF.164 Huawei’s strength in patent 
filing comes form its R&D division, where 46% of Hauwei’s 
employees are engaging in R&D and 10% of its annual revenues are 
invested in R&D (e.g., $2.5 billion invested in R&D in 2010).165 The 
company operates twenty R&D centers, of which thirteen are located 
in other countries including Germany, France, Italy, Russia, India, the 
United States, and Canada.166 
Huawei is also fairly active in seeking licensing opportunities. In 
2010, the company paid Western companies $222 million in licensing 
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fees and signed cross-licensing agreements with all major IPR holders 
in the industry. 
ZTE, for its part, equally attaches a great importance to patenting. 
As mentioned above, the company took second place in the list of 
PCT patent publications in 2010 with 1863 patent filings, jumping 
from twenty-third in 2009. Forty-five percent of the company’s 
patents in 2009 were filed for 3G and 4G technologies, as well as in 
the terminal, access, bearer network, and chipset technology fields. 
Out of 25,000 patents filed by ZTE, over ninety percent are invention 
patents, including over 1,700 LTE/SAE patents.167 In addition, the 
company is a member of seventy standard organizations and holds 
important positions within those organizations.168 
As the telecom business grows and the number of patents 
increases, lawsuits between the two Chinese telecom rivals and the 
telecom companies of other countries have become more frequent. In 
early April 2011, Ericsson sued ZTE in the U.K., Italy, and Germany 
for infringement of patents for GSM and WCDMA after trying to 
reach a patent licensing agreement with ZTE, under which ZTE 
would have to pay royalties to the Swedish company.169 In retaliation, 
ZTE also filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Ericsson (China) 
Communications Co. in Beijing, alleging that Ericsson products sold 
in China infringed ZTE’s patents on core networks, global system for 
mobile communications, and 4G mobile technology.170 ZTE also 
planned to invalidate Ericsson’s three patents in China covering 2G 
and 3G mobile technologies on the ground that they do not meet the 
criterion of inventive step.171 Then, on April 28, 2011, Huawei filed 
lawsuits against ZTE in Germany, France, and Hungary for allegedly 
infringing Huawei’s patents relating to data cards and 4G wireless 
LTE technologies and for illegally using Huawei’s trademark on its 
data card products, and was awarded an injunction.172 One day later, 
ZTE counter-sued Huawei for patent infringement over its fourth-
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generation Long-Term Evolution, or LTE, cellular wireless 
technologies in China.173 These lawsuits demonstrate that China’s 
telecom companies are not only competing with global rivals in filing 
patents, they are also competing with each other by using patent 
lawsuits both defensively and offensively. 
C.  Environment-Related Industries (Automobile and Green-
Technologies) 
1.  Automobile Industry 
In September 2011, Xinhua reported that the number of 
automobiles in China had reached 100 million.174 China has become 
the world’s largest automotive market since 2009. Of the automobiles 
produced, 44.3% are local brands (BYD, Lifan, Chang’an, Geely, 
Chery, Hafei, Jianghuai, Great Wall, Roewe), with the rest being 
produced by joint ventures with foreign car manufacturers.175 
However, the innovation level of the industry is considerably low. 
According to Xu Ping, Party Secretary of Chang’an Automobile Co. 
Ltd., there are about four R&D models in Chinese auto industry: 
simple imitation, borrowing multinational platforms, mimicking the 
appearance of other foreign brands, and independent innovation.176  
Most of the Chinese auto companies are adopting the first three 
models. For example, the designer of Chery’s QQ was accused of 
being an imitation of Chevrolet’s “Spark.”177 Honda has alleged that 
its design was copied by Shijiazhuang ShuangHuan Automobile and 
Hebei Xinkai Automobile,178 and Italian automaker Fiat has sued 
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Great Wall Motors for infringing its design for the Peri.179 These 
cases indicate the seriousness of the imitation problem among 
Chinese companies and the importance of filing patents in China to 
prevent imitation. 
Chinese auto companies’ trouble with infringement lawsuits 
derives largely from their lack of IPRs. Among the top ten patent 
filers shown in Table 1, transportation manufacturing ranks seventh, 
accounting for only 4.5% of PCT filings and 4.4% of domestic filings. 
Patents for automobiles may constitute an even smaller percentage 
among the transportation manufacturing industry.  Chinese 
automobile companies typically hold very few patents. For example, 
Chery had a total of 196 patents by 2005 (five invention patents), 
compared to Toyota’s 3145 Chinese patents by 2005 (2473 invention 
patents).180 Before 2005, none of the five Chinese automobile 
companies (Dongfeng, Chery, Chang’an, FAW and Geely), had 
applied for more than one hundred invention and utility model 
patents. Most of the companies applied for less than forty annually, 
with the exception of Dongfeng who applied for one hundred in 2003, 
and Chang’an who applied for sixty in 2004.181 In comparison, annual 
applications for invention and utility patents filed in China by some 
foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), such as, Honda, 
Toyota, Nissan, and GM, during the same period exceeded one 
hundred, with Honda filing about 400 each year before 2003, close to 
500 in 2004, and more than 500 in 2005.182 Interestingly, Chinese 
automobile companies filed more design patents than invention and 
utility model patents. For example, Chang’an filed more than 300 
design patents in 2005.183 Compared to invention and utility patents, 
foreign OEMs filed fewer design patents in China. For example, 
Honda filed fewer than 100 design patents in 2005, and GM filed 
none from 2001 to 2005.184 This may be one of the factors that 
contributed to the disputes between Chinese and foreign auto 
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companies over design patents. For example, in Chevrolet “Spark” v. 
Chery QQ case, GM did not even file a patent for its design in 
China.185 
Compared with foreign auto companies, Chinese auto companies 
filed even fewer patents in other countries. Prior to 2007, there was 
only one application by a Chinese OEM filed in a European patent 
office. In terms of quality, multinational auto companies pay more 
attention to new energy vehicle technology and electronic control 
technology while Chinese companies focus on engine, body, and 
body ancillary systems technology.186 
Interestingly, a study by Ping Zhang and Huaiwen He found that 
China First Automobile Works Group Corporation (FAW) filed the 
highest number of patent applications, seventeen, in 2005, but 
suffered a profit loss in the same year, and the company blamed the 
heavy investment in R&D for the loss.187 The FAW case indicates that 
Chinese auto companies face great difficulties in engaging R&D, let 
alone IP commercialization. The low rate of patenting may also be 
attributable to the fact that China is a late-comer to the auto industry, 
within which most basic technologies have already been patented. In 
addition, the Chinese auto industry also faces the difficulty of in 
getting new technology transferred from the multinational 
corporations as many technology transfer contracts contain 
prohibiting clauses. Without enough IPRs and technology transfers, 
Chinese auto companies are forced to imitate, which leads to greater 
risk of IP infringement. Currently, the R&D and business models 
adopted by the Chinese auto companies primarily include the 
following: (1) technology transfer; (2) collaboration in R&D; (3) 
controlling share or acquisition; and (4) commissioned R&D. 
Through these models, Chinese auto companies may hope to get more 
IPRs. For example, Geely acquired Volvo and all of its IPRs; and 
SAIC acquired South Korea’s Ssang Yong, with its controlled SUV 
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and C level platform and auto engine technology, and also acquired 
Rover’s 75 and 25 core IPRs.188 
2.  GreenTech Industry. 
According to “The China Greentech Report 2011” produced by 
China Greentech Initiative, China has emerged as a global greentech 
leader.189 By the end of 2010, China had invested 354 billion yaun 
($54.4 billion); installed 44.7 GW of wind power; built 8,358 
kilometers of high speed rail; and China’s greentech market covered 
wind, solar power, emissions control, and wastewater treatment.190 
There are about six greentech sectors: cleaner conventional energy, 
renewable energy, electric power infrastructure, green building, 
cleaner transportation, and clean water.191 Each sector has its 
strengths and weaknesses in R&D.  For example, China ranks first in 
manufacture and consumption of solar water heaters, but it is still 
focusing on the technology of producing low temperature water and 
solar photovoltaic (PV) products, which are mostly exported. The 
technology for solar power generation systems, large-scale solar 
power collection and storage, and light-heat conversion techniques is 
still in the preliminary stages. China lacks the technology for 
producing high quality solar cells, so 90% of the materials for solar 
cells have to be imported, while most advanced countries refuse to 
transfer the technology and so 91.22% of power is still produced by 
traditional resources such as coal. By 2010, the installed capacity for 
wind power should have reached 20.00 million kw, but China is still 
backwards technologically on wind turbines and large scale wind 
power integration.192 
Obtaining patents on greentech is a challenge for the Chinese 
greentech sector, as in auto industry, because greentech involves 
many conventional technologies which have already been patented by 
developed countries and new technologies are held mostly by U.S. 
 
188 Chris V. Nicholson, Chinese Carmaker Geely Completes Acquisition of Volvo From 
Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/business/global 
/03volvo.html. Also see Implementing the Scientific Development Philosophy and Fulfill 
Corporate Social Responsibilities, SAIC MOTOR, http://www.saicmotor.com/english 
/xwzx/xwk/3605.shtml. 
189 CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, THE CHINA GREENTECH REPORT 2011, available 
at http://www.pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/634394109978005634_cn_greentech_report 
_apr2011.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
190 Id. at 11. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
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companies that refuse to transfer to Chinese companies because the 
U.S. government and industries wish to keep green jobs at home193. 
Therefore, unlike other industries, the number of patent applications 
for greentech filed in China by foreigners is fairly small. The 
following statistics show a compilation of patent applications for 
greentech filed with the SIPO in the period of 2005–2009:194 
• Wind technology (e.g., wind turbine): total 1622 applications, 
among which 1435 are from Chinese applicants and 87 from 
foreign applicants, and 51.2% for utility models. 
• Hydrogen technology (e.g., fuel cells): total of 739 applications, 
among which 657 are from Chinese applicants, 82 from foreign 
applicants, and 254 for utility models (all from Chinese 
applicants). 
• Biomass energy technology (e.g., biofuel): total of 791 
applications, among which 292 are for invention patents and 498 
are for utility models. 
• Ocean & water energy (e.g., hydraulic turbine): total of 451 
applications, among which foreign applicants account for 24%. 
• Natural gas: total of 772 applications, among which 50.09% are 
for invention patents and 20.86% are from foreign applicants. 
These figures suggest three things: (1) the total number of patent 
applications in the greentech field is generally low; (2) foreign 
companies and individuals are reluctant to file greentech patents in 
China; and (3) too many applications for utility models indicates that 
the patent applications filed by the Chinese heavily concentrate in low 
level technologies. We can, therefore, conclude that the innovation 
capability of the Chinese greentech industry is still very weak, and 
can be worsened by the reluctance of foreign greentech superpowers, 
particularly the United States, which holds 50 percent of greentech 
patents, to transfer their technologies to China. These superpowers 
 
193 See Letter from Alliance for Clean Technology Innovation to Secretary Hillary 
Clinton and Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern Regarding IPR and 
Technology Discussions at Cancun Climate Change Talks, December 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/20101207.pdf; see also John Lorinc, Climate Change 
and Intellectual Property, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG, Nov. 28, 2011, 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/climate-change-and-intellectual-property/; 
GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CENTER, Report: Efforts to Weaken IP Would Cost 
U.S. Millions in Green Jobs, available at http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/sites/default 
/files/GIPC_-_Green_Jobs_Leave_Behind.pdf. 
194 FUDAN UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH CENTER, Technology 
Transfer Issues in Past-Kyoto Protocol Era, High Level Forum Materials 4, 9, 15, 17, 18 
(2009) (on file with author). 
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may one day speed up their patent filings in China, but before they do 
that China can only rely on itself to develop its greentech. 
III 
IP AND INNOVATION IN CHINESE HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES: 
REFLECTIONS 
Part I of this paper introduced the prevailing views on the 
relationship between IP and innovation which are very diverse, some 
contradictory and some industry-specific. Adopting the industry-
specific approach, Part II of the paper empirically investigated six of 
China’s high-tech industries, their industry and market scale, R&D 
capability and models, and patenting filing and litigation status. These 
two parts serve to provide some useful information for readers to 
compare and to reflect on the role of IPRs in different countries and 
different industrial sectors. What follows are some immediate 
reflections of my own on the above two parts. 
First, IPRs may not play any role in innovation in some developing 
countries and the least developed countries (LDCs) which are 
extremely poor and do not have any innovation capacity, but they do 
play some role in promoting innovation in developing countries 
which are relatively well off and have a high tech capacity. The role 
of patents in China is evidenced by the parallel growth of patents and 
the national economy. China is the largest developing country with 
the per capita gross national income ranking 127th in the world, but 
by the second quarter of 2010 it has became the second largest 
economy with a GDP of $1.337 trillion.195  In addition, China is also a 
country with a relatively high technological capacity which makes 
patents relevant to innovation. According to the CIPR’s report, 
technological capacity is determined based on the extent of patenting 
activity in the United States and through the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT).196 In 2010, China filed 6552 patent applications with 
the USPTO.197 In 2010, China’s PCT applications reached 12,339, up 
from 7900 applications registered in the previous year, ranking China 
 
195 China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, 
Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/china-economy-passes-japan 
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fourth among all other countries for PCT filing.198 These figures 
demonstrate that China is a developing country with a relatively high 
technological capacity in which patents respond to innovative 
activities more positively than in technologically weak developing 
countries.199 
Secondly, IPRs may not be crucial for generating inventions, but 
they are indispensable for commercialization. Innovation process 
involves many factors and stages including invention and 
commercialization, and whether a country is innovative is assessed by 
how many of its inventions can be commercialized into useful 
products. Although many inventions start with inventors’ pure 
intellectual curiosities and public funding support without much IPR 
incentive, IPRs (particularly patents) are extremely important in 
securing financial investment and technology licensing in 
commercialization process. The United States’ success in 
commercialization of its vast amount of inventions can be attributed 
to its pro-innovation patent system and its leading position in 
patenting. On the other hand, the weakness in the commercialization 
of inventions in most Chinese industries indicates that the role of 
IPRs needs to be strengthened. Despite the impressive number of 
patent applications, China remains a largely imitation-oriented 
country. This is due partly to bad IP management and the low rate of 
IP commercialization. For example, it was estimated that the 
commercialization of inventions in Chinese universities is about ten 
percent, which is fairly low compared with thirty percent 
commercialization rate of universities in industrialized countries.200 
Without commercialization, many inventions, even patented, will 
remain in laboratories. The Chinese government has recently 
recognized the adverse impact of low commercialization on the 
development of China’s knowledge-based economy and the process 
of transforming it into an innovation-oriented country, and adopted 
national policy and laws addressing the importance of 
commercializing technologies. For example, the “Outlines of the 
 
198 China filed 12,339 PCT applications in 2010. The top three countries are the Unites 
States (44,855), Japan (32,156), and Germany (17,171). See China’s International Patent 
Fillings on 56.2-pct Jump last Year: WIPO, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, http://english 
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200 Chen Meizhang, Thoughts on Industrialization of University Patent Technologies, 
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Chen Naiwei, eds., 2006). 
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National Intellectual Property Strategy” has made “utilization” of 
IPRs an important strategy.201 The “Law on Science and Technology 
Progress” was amended in 2008 to add an objective of “promoting the 
transformation of scientific and technological advances into practical 
productive forces.”202 Furthermore, the government has formed some 
national programs to promote the commercialization of R&D results 
by linking upstream, middle-stream, and down-stream research, as 
well as tightening the alliances between education, research, 
application, and production. For example, various Ministries of the 
central government, together with local governments, have launched 
the programs including “1,000 new-energy vehicles in 10 cities,” 
“100,000 energy-saving LED street lamps in 10 cities,” “golden sun,” 
and “next generation broadcasting network,” among others. These 
programs are useful in connecting university research projects with 
the practical needs of emerging strategic industries.203 Whether these 
efforts to promote commercialization can turn China’s large stock of 
patented technologies into commercial products remains to be seen, 
but China is certainly moving in the right direction. Based on the 
United States’ experience, to be successful in IP commercialization, a 
pro-innovation patent system has to be in place, which includes broad 
patentable subject matters, an inventor-friendly patent prosecution 
system, and a pro-patentee litigation system. This pro-innovation 
patent system needs to be supported by comprehensive national 
legislation on IP commercialization and innovation. 
Thirdly, IPRs may not play any role in one particular industry, but 
they may play a significant role in another industry; in other words, 
the role of IPR varies in different industries and technological sectors. 
This has particular implications for China. The success of some of 
China’s industries and technological sectors, such as biotech and 
telecom, is attributable to a high rate of patenting and good IP 
strategy, while the backwardness of others, like the pharmaceutical 
and automotive industries, may be caused by low patent rates or poor 
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patent strategy. IP (or patents) may not be an important factor in 
innovations in some of the Chinese industries, like software, but some 
sectors may urgently need more indigenous IPRs to boost R&D 
because foreign IPR holders refuse to transfer their technologies, as 
was the case in the greentech industry. The barriers for tech transfer 
of core technologies are still high and, therefore, the role of patents to 
promote self-innovation in China is crucial. 
Lastly, IPRs may be overprotected in many developed countries, 
but they may be still under-protected in China. Unlike the U.S. IP 
system which has over 200 years of history and, in some instances, 
has been abused by right-holders to prevent competition and access to 
technologies, China’s IP system, on the other hand, is less than thirty 
years old and needs to be matured. The potential of the IP system for 
promoting innovation has not been fully reached. China should 
strengthen rather than weaken its IP system in order to promote 
innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
As a developing country with a high technological capacity, China 
is on its way to transforming itself from a world’s manufacturing 
center to a knowledge-based society and from an imitation-oriented 
country to an innovation-oriented country. China is destined to 
become not only a “greentech leader” or an “automobile 
powerhouse,” but also a top IPR holder and a Champaign for IPR 
protection, because technology and IPRs should go hand-in-hand. 
Currently, the numbers of IPRs that Chinese inventors and 
enterprises hold are insufficient and disproportionate to the scale of 
the industry and market, even when compared with R&D capability in 
some sectors. The leading position of a few Chinese companies in 
PCT filings for one industry sector does not represent the true state of 
development of other industrial sectors. China has a long way to go to 
become a real innovative country, and IP still has its unique role to 
play in helping China to become one. 
 
